Dissertation Ruminations, Pt. IV

Summa Theologiae IIIa q. 10, a. 3; Excerpt from Chapter I on St. Thomas’ Treatment of the Beatific Vision in Christ

I have been asked to publish some of my dissertation on the beatific vision in Christ as the principle of the vision of the elect and subsequent deification. I will post pieces of it over time for those interested in my research. I have done very little to clean this up from its original submission and have not added further explanations. This is just offered for the interest of the few who may find it edifying. I reserve the right to publish the entirety of the text at a future date, in which case, this series may need to come down.

Article 3

We now move on to article three, in which it is asked whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word. The question is built upon what was just discussed in the second article. In that article, the soul of Christ is shown to know all things that have existed, currently exist, or will come to exist based on the fact that all things are created through the Word and thus belong to Him to know. Here, Thomas addresses the idea of an infinity and whether Christ, in His human soul, can know the infinite within the Word. In this article, Thomas is finding the middle ground between all things that the soul of Christ knows in the Word and the infinite potentiality of the things that God knows.¹

To this question, there are three objections, and these objections essentially all point to one reality: “Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite because the capacity is finite, since it is created.”² As we have said above, the soul of Christ is created, and thus it is finite. Infinity, taken in the common and broad sense, seems to fit this objection. Infinity is something that cannot be contained, and thus, a created thing being finite could not contain that which is infinite. However, Thomas will take this occasion to return to Aristotle and make a distinction between what is meant by an actual infinity and a potential infinity. It is in this distinction that the answer to this question can be given and understood.

In order to understand Aristotle’s distinction, Thomas considers an argument in the Sed contra that the soul of Christ knows the infinite because it can “cleanse infinite sins.”³ This returns to what was said in article two, that the soul of Christ knows all things which pertain to Himself in the Word. Part of what pertains to Christ is to be able to forgive sins.⁴ These sins are infinite in man potentially. Sin can be said to be infinite in two ways. In the first way, sin is infinite in its turning away from the immutable good:

First, there is a turning away from the immutable good, which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite… Accordingly, insofar as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the pain of loss, which also is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e., God.⁵

In his treatment of sin,⁶ Thomas evaluates the immensity of sin in regard to what it is rejecting, i.e., the infinite Good. When man rejects God, he brings upon himself an infinite punishment since God’s punishment is given in accord with the gravity of the offense.⁷ In this way, sin is said to be infinite.

The second way that sin can be said to be infinite is in the potential number of sins that man can commit. Thomas quotes from the First Letter of St. John to this effect, “Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 John 2:2: He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.”⁸ Here, Thomas interprets the letter of St. John as referring to an infinite number of sins, both those that are actually committed and those that are potentially able to be committed. Thomas concludes that the soul of Christ must know the infinite sin of man so that He might cleanse the sin.

Courtesy of the Catholic Company

This brings us to the question of how the finite soul of Christ can know the infinite. This is how we come to the distinction between an actual infinity and a potential infinity properly speaking. Thomas begins, “Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways: First, simply, i.e., whatever is a being in act; second, relatively, i.e., whatever is a being in potentiality.”⁹ Here, Thomas is saying that a being can be in one of two ways, either in act or in potency. This means that a being either exists now or has the potential to come to exist in the future. He goes on:

… everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act, and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known.¹⁰

Thomas now comes to a creature’s ability to know a being. He says that knowledge of a being applies to that being actually existing. No created being can know a being in potency since that being does not yet exist. All created beings need their senses to be able to come to know something else. Senses cannot perceive that which does not yet exist. Thus, to know something, it must first exist. We now come to the question of the possibility of an infinite number of beings in act. Thomas addresses this in Question 7 of the Prima pars. In article four of the question, Thomas concludes that an infinite multitude, i.e., an actual infinity, cannot exist either absolutely or accidentally. He says:

… every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence, it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental.¹¹

The possibility of an actual infinity rests on the ability of it to be measured, e.g., given number.¹² We measure multitude by how it is reckoned by the numbers corresponding to how many there are, plus one. These individual numbers themselves are finite, as each species of number is measured by one. Thomas then applies this to creation, “Likewise multitude in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence, everything created must be comprehended in a certain number.”¹³ All things created are given number, as God has created a specific number of different creatures and a specific number of each individual creature. Those numbers of creatures come into being when God has ordained that they do, and so they are never simultaneous. Therefore, there is not an actually infinite multitude of substances in existence. Returning now to the present article on the knowledge of Christ, Garrigou-Lagrange comments, “The soul of Christ does not know the actually infinite; that is… He does not know an actually infinite multitude of substances, because such a multitude was not created…”¹⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange is clarifying that Christ cannot know an actual infinity since it has not been created; it does not exist, and as has been said above, one cannot know something if it doesn’t exist.

In reference to knowledge of the potential being, Thomas says only that being whose power it is to know the potential being can know the being before it is brought to act. This power alone resides in the creator. As it was said above in article two, Christ knows all things that pertain to His person according to the power of the Word. It is within the power of the Word, who is God, to know the potential being of things. It is not knowledge in the being Itself; it is knowledge of the potential to exist. It is here that we bring in the idea of a potential infinity. Thomas says that it is possible for a potential infinity to exist, “But a potentially infinite multitude is possible, because the increase of multitude follows on the division of magnitude… Hence… the infinite can also be found potentially in the addition of multitude.”¹⁵ The possibility of the potential infinity lies in the fact that one more can always be added to the multitude since that multitude can also be infinitely divided. And thus, we return to what was said above concerning the potential knowledge that resides in Christ. Using the example of sin, Christ knows all sins that have been committed and are being committed in this very moment; these constitute a finite number and can thus be known to Christ. Furthermore, in the Word, Christ’s soul also knows all the sins that could potentially be committed because He is able to know a potential infinity since it does not actually have being yet, and it is within the power of the Word to know these sins since He is the one who cleanses them.¹⁶

1. In the Respondeo section of article two, Thomas says, “Second, all things may be taken to widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never have been, nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word.” I believe that this is essential to understanding the following article. There is an ‘area’ between what is and what will be, and all that is in potentiality that only God can know. These things, which are in potentiality, as Thomas will elucidate in this article, are infinite. The key to understanding what this article is exploring is the distinction between an actual infinity and a potential infinity. Aristotle’s treatise on infinity is of use here. See “Physics,” The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol I, trans. W.D. Ross, ed. Johnathan Barnes, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) Bk. III, Ch. 4-8.

2. ST IIIa q. 10, a. 3.

3. ST IIIa q. 10, a. 3.

4. Cf. Matt. 9:6.

5. ST Ia-IIae q. 87, a. 4.

6. For a succinct summary of St. Thomas’ theology concerning sin, see Taylor Patrick O’Neill, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin: A Thomistic Analysis, (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019) 41-50; as well as Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997) 77-89; and especially, D.Q. McInerny, A Course in Thomistic Ethics, (Elmhurst, PA: The Priestly Fraternity of Saint Peter, 1997) 193-237.

7. Cf ST Ia-IIae q. 87, aa. 1 and 5.

8. ST IIIa q. 10, a. 3.

9. ST IIIa q. 10, a. 3.

10. ST IIIa q. 10, a. 3.

11. ST Ia q. 7, a. 4.

12. This discussion is a difficult one for those who have written on it. Garrigou-Lagrange gives some context: “We shall see that it can be denied that St. Thomas took a definite stand on this difficult problem. Nevertheless, the Thomists and many other Scholastics commonly deny the possibility of an actually infinite multitude of actually existing things. Many of them, however, grant that a multitude of past days could be actually infinite antecedently and innumerable, just as a multitude of intellectual acts of an immortal soul will be infinite subsequently, but these acts do not all exist at the same time.” The One God, 245. Garrigou does stake his claim and his interpretation of St. Thomas a few pages later in saying, “The conclusion of St. Thomas is this: An actually infinite multitude of coexisting things, even accidentally connected, is an impossibility.” The One God, 247.

13. ST Ia q. 7, a. 4.

14. Christ the Savior, 372.

15. ST Ia q. 7, a. 4.

16. Garrigou-Lagrange comments, “Christ’s soul knows in the Word infinite things that are in the potentiality of the creature. Thus, as states in the counterargument, ‘Christ’s soul knows all its power and all it can do. It can cleanse, however, infinite sins.’” Christ the Savior, 373